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RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 4303
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0517
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 4920
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0776
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0543
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0799
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4504
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2796
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0815
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1454
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0194
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0347
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S E C R E T TASHKENT 000977

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [UZ](#)

SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: POLITICAL INTRIGUE, CONCERN ABOUT A
COLOR REVOLUTION

REF: TASHKENT 566

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

Civil Society Institute an Arm of the NSS

¶1. (S/NF) According to an Embassy contact speaking in early August, Maruf Shakirovich Usmanov was Director of Uzbekistan's Civil Society Institute (CSI). While CSI's nominal purpose is to promote civil society, it is actually a branch of the National Security Service (NSS) and its true purpose is to prevent a color revolution in Uzbekistan, the contact stated. The headquarters of CSI had also grown from roughly 200 personnel to 300 personnel as of early August, according to the source. CSI closely monitors the behavior of non-government organizations, exchanges information with law enforcement agencies and the rest of the NSS, and reports to the Presidential Apparatus.

Inoyatov Pressuring Norov, Outmaneuvering Atayev

¶2. (S/NF) The source indicated that the NSS controls the information flow to President Karimov, and that Foreign Minister Norov is under significant stress due to pressure from NSS Chairman Inoyatov. Norov currently does not have regular access to President Karimov, and Inoyatov is trying to prevent Norov from developing a closer relationship with Karimov as was the case when Kamilov was Foreign Minister. The National Security Service also has penetrated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and an unspecified number of NSS officers there are monitoring Norov's every move. Inoyatov has "kompromat" (compromising information) on Norov obtained from Norov's days as an Ambassador in Europe, where

he was allegedly involved in unspecified "shady dealings." The contact stated that NSS officers in Uzbekistan's embassies overseas have reported to Inoyatov on the behavior of Uzbekistan's Ambassadors. Inoyatov has not revealed the "kompromat" in question to Karimov, but is using it as leverage against Norov.

¶3. (S/NF) The source indicated that National Security Council (NSC) First Deputy Secretary Rakhmankulov's influence is growing, and that he has regained significant access to President Karimov relative to NSC Secretary Atayev. This was due to Inoyatov's interference; Inoyatov is interested in balancing the two to prevent either one from becoming too powerful. (Comment: Per reftel, as of May, Atayev had enjoyed greater influence and access to Karimov than Rakhmankulov. End comment.)

Mirziyayev Staying Out of the Spotlight

¶4. (S/NF) Prime Minister Mirziyayev believed that President Karimov becomes jealous when the media show other high-ranking GOU officials, and that Karimov fires those that he perceives to be potential rivals, the source indicated. Mirziyayev had thus instructed the state-controlled media to never show him on TV. The contact said that Karimov works closely with Mirziyayev and does not want to dismiss him given that Mirziyayev is doing everything that Gulnora Karimova wants. Furthermore, the contact said, both Karimov and Karimova currently need Mirziyayev, and allow him a cut

of the Karimov family wealth.

Leery of Russia

¶5. (S/NF) The Government of Uzbekistan has also become increasingly suspicious of Russia, the source said. President Karimov and the NSS are carefully scrutinizing every Russian official request to visit Uzbekistan, and are concerned about Russian attempts to recruit GOU officials.

An Offer from Sarkozy

¶6. (S/NF) The source said that in early June, France's Ombudsman for Human Rights had met with Foreign Minister Norov and Uzbekistan's Ombudsman for Human Rights Rashidova. The French official had conveyed a letter from President Sarkozy to President Karimov advising Karimov to turn away from Russia. If this occurred, the European Union would avoid imposing sanctions on Uzbekistan. Karimov's reaction to the proposal is unknown.

Comment:

¶7. (S/NF) While we cannot verify all of the contact's claims, this GOU contact has provided reliable reporting in the past.

The source's claim that CSI is intended to counter color revolutions is consistent with our view that the GOU perceives a threat to Uzbekistan's stability from NGOs; GOU officials have indeed expressed concern to us in the past that certain NGOs are trying to destabilize Uzbekistan. The comments about the NSS's leverage over Foreign Minister Norov are also intriguing and provide a possible explanation for previous MFA complaints about his weakness and failure to stand up to "other ministries." Media coverage would seem to support the contact's claims about Karimov's desire to prevent significant coverage of other Uzbek officials; generally, Karimov is the only senior GOU official shown on front-page articles in state newspapers, and when other officials are shown, the picture of Karimov is far larger than those of other members of the elite.

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